Update review · November 21, 2026
DNS-like Agent Discovery Architecture (Update)
What Changed
The -01 revision adds one new mechanism, one new author, and a round of typo fixes. None of the feedback from the -00 review has been addressed.
The three-tier architecture is unchanged. Agent Root, Agent Registry, and Agent Resolver all work the way they did in -00.
New Mechanism: Trust Bundles
The draft now says discovery is not enough. Agents in different domains also need to verify each other's identity, and the draft calls this a "scalable federation mechanism."
The answer is a trust bundle. Three things were added to support it:
- Two new terms: Agent Identity Credential and Trust Bundle. A trust bundle is a domain-level set of trust anchors used to validate agent identity credentials.
- A new first duty for the Agent Registry: manage the trust bundle for its domain and expose a URL that serves the latest version.
- A new
trust_bundle_endpointfield in the Capability Card, for examplehttps://example-registry1.com/trust-bundle.
The flow is simple. A client gets a Capability Card from a resolver, fetches the trust bundle from the URL in the card, and uses it to validate the target agent's credential.
Does the Trust Bundle Work?
Not yet. The draft names the concept and stops there.
The trust bundle has no format. The draft says it contains "public keys and associated metadata" with "freshness information." There is no schema, no media type, and no reference to an existing format such as a JWK Set. Two implementations cannot exchange a trust bundle today.
The credential has no format either. An Agent Identity Credential is defined as a "credential that represents the agent identity." It could be an X.509 certificate, a JWT, or something else. The draft also doesn't say how the credential names the agent, so there is no way to check that a credential belongs to the Composite Agent FQDN in the card.
The trust chain is circular. The client learns the trust bundle URL from the Capability Card. The card comes from a resolver, which copied it from a registry. A compromised resolver or registry can swap the URL and the client will validate an attacker's credential successfully. The Agent Root's whitelist of registry suffixes is the only anchor, and the draft never ties the trust bundle URL to it.
Any anchor can vouch for any agent. The registry aggregates anchors from multiple identity authorities into one domain-level bundle. Nothing limits an anchor to the agents its IdP actually issued for. One compromised IdP in a registry can impersonate every agent in that registry.
It overlaps with tls_ca_info. The Capability Card already carried a CA fingerprint and certificate validity window. The draft doesn't say how the two relate or which one wins.
The endpoint location is unspecified. The draft says the URL "can be .well-known or dynamically generated." No well-known URI is registered.
The term "trust bundle" comes from SPIFFE, and the IETF home for this work is the WIMSE working group. The draft cites neither. Referencing the WIMSE architecture for the credential and trust anchor model would be a better starting point than defining new terms here.
Was Previous Feedback Addressed?
No. Every issue from the -00 review still stands:
- Agent Root governance. Still no description of who runs the root, how registries enroll, or whether more than one root can exist.
- Capability matching.
capability_listis still free text capped at 200 characters, with no vocabulary and no matching algorithm. The resolver query API is still undefined. - Security Considerations. Still "to be added." This matters more now that the draft makes identity verification claims.
- Push versus pull. The Root still "pushes" the whitelist to resolvers while resolvers "pull" it from the Root.
agent_online_status. Still in the Capability Card with no update mechanism behind it.- IANA Considerations. Still "to be added," even though the draft uses the
_agent-index._tcpservice label.
Section 7, which covers how a client finds its resolver, is still two sentences long.
Removed and Editorial Changes
No mechanisms were removed.
The Change History appendix was dropped, so the draft no longer documents its own changes. References are now split into normative and informative, with RFC 9665 moved to informative. Many typos were fixed, including the section titles. The Figure 1 caption still reads "Archtecture."
New Author
Peter Chunchi Liu (Huawei) joins as second author. He has no published RFCs and 15 active drafts, three of them adopted by working groups (ACME, SATP, IOTOPS). He is Secretary of the SATP working group.
His recent drafts focus on agent identity and delegation across OAuth and WIMSE, including draft-ni-wimse-ai-agent-identity. That lines up with the trust bundle material added in this revision.
Bottom Line
This is a small update that widens the scope of the draft without filling in the existing gaps. The discovery architecture is no closer to being implementable, and the new identity layer is a sketch.
The useful feedback for the authors is to pick one. Either specify discovery well enough to implement and point to WIMSE for identity, or define the trust bundle and credential formats along with a Security Considerations section that covers the resolver and registry as attack points.