Meeting · IETF 127
WIMSE WG at IETF 127
San Francisco, US · November 14 to 20, 2026
13 drafts on the agenda, 13 reviewed here. Reviewed drafts have a short summary and a link to the full review. The rest show the draft's own abstract. Official agenda →
Agenda as of November 16, 2026. It can change before the meeting.
Session A 8 slots
Chair Updates
Workload Proof Token
WIMSE Workload Proof Token Moves Into the Authorization Header
A Workload Identity Token (WIT) binds a public key to a workload identity. It must not be used as a bearer token. Something has to prove the sender holds the private key.
The Workload Proof Token (WPT) is that proof. It is a short-lived JWT, signed with the WIT's key, sent with each HTTP request.
WIMSE Architecture
Every WIMSE protocol draft needs the same vocabulary: workload, trust domain, workload identifier, workload identity credential, security context. This document is where those terms are defined.
It also describes the components around a workload and the scenarios the protocol drafts are meant to serve.
AI Identity Management System (AIMS)
AI Identity Management System (AIMS)
People keep inventing new authentication and authorization schemes for AI agents. Most of them rebuild things that already exist.
This draft argues that an agent is a workload (Section 4). It then shows how WIMSE, SPIFFE, OAuth and OpenID Shared Signals already cover agent identity, credentials, authentication, authorization and monitoring. It defines no new protocol.
Workload Authorization Grant
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Workload Authorization Grant (WAG)
Agent platforms create and destroy agents constantly, one per channel, repository, or pipeline. Registering each one as an OAuth client at every SaaS authorization server does not scale. So every agent in an installation ends up sharing one credential, and nobody can tell which agent did what (Section 1).
This draft lets an authorization server trust the platform once. After that, any agent the platform vouches for gets an access token on its first request, with its own stable identifier.
Workload Identity Metadata
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WIMSE Workload Identity Metadata
Deployments stuff attributes into workload identifiers. The draft's own example is
spiffe://example.com/ns/prod/team/payments/role/reconciler/service/reconciliation. Relying parties then parse the path and authorize on the pieces.The draft says to stop doing that. The identifier names the workload. Group, role, and entitlements travel separately as Workload Metadata, either as claims in a JWT credential or from an authenticated lookup API.
Cross-Organizational Delegation Requirements
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Cross-Organizational Delegation for Workload and Agent Identity: Problem Statement and Requirements
This draft addresses the authorization challenge that arises when autonomous AI agents delegate sub-tasks across organizational boundaries — for example, an orchestrator agent at Company A invoking a tool at Company B on behalf of a human at Company A. Existing workload identity and token mechanisms (including OAuth and RFC 8693 token exchange) were designed for shallow, intra-organization delegation to a known authorization server. This draft argues they cannot handle: recursive authority attenuation across multiple hops, cross-org verification without pre-provisioned federation, and offline verification without per-request callbacks.
This is a problem statement and requirements document only — it does not propose a solution.
AOB
Session B, joint with OAuth (Thursday) 11 slots
Chair Intro
Identity Chaining
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Identity Chaining Is in the RFC Editor Queue
A client in one trust domain needs to call an API in another. Each domain has its own authorization server. The second domain needs to know which user the request is for and what was authorized.
This draft names a pattern for that. The client does a Token Exchange at its own authorization server to get a JWT authorization grant. It then presents that grant to the other domain's authorization server using RFC 7523. No user interaction happens in the second domain.
OAuth–WIMSE–SPIFFE boundaries
The Future of Client ID
AuthZen
SPIFFE OAuth Client Authentication
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OAuth SPIFFE Client Authentication
A workload running under SPIFFE already has an attested credential, its SVID. To call an OAuth token endpoint today it still needs a second credential, a client secret or a
private_key_jwtkey, provisioned out of band.This draft lets the workload use the SVID itself as its OAuth client credential. It covers all three SVID formats: JWT-SVID, X509-SVID, and WIT-SVID.
Cross-Domain Transaction Tokens
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Taking a Transaction Token Across the Trust Boundary
Transaction Tokens carry the authorization context of a request through a company's internal call chain. They are deliberately scoped to one trust domain. The Txn-Token spec says a Txn-Token MUST NOT be accepted outside the trust domain named in its
aud.So what happens when a workload deep in that call chain needs to call a partner API?
Transaction Tokens for Agents + Txn Tokens BCP
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Transaction Tokens for Agents Adds an Agent Chain Claim to Txn-Tokens
Transaction Tokens carry user identity and transaction context through an internal call chain. They say nothing about whether an AI agent was involved.
That's the gap this draft targets. A database three hops deep can't tell a direct human API call from a request that passed through two autonomous agents. Audit logs record the operation but not the agent path that caused it.
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Transaction Tokens BCP Has Real Deployment Lessons and Several Conflicts With the Base Spec
Transaction Tokens define a token format and a request to the Transaction Token Service (TTS). They don't say how to roll that out across hundreds of services.
This draft tries to fill that gap. Section 1.2 says the guidance is "derived from production deployments of Txn-Token systems." It covers token size, lifetime, propagation libraries, validation rollout, telemetry, and async workloads.
Transactional Access Tokens
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Transactional Access Tokens Bring Txn-Token Context to the Front Door
Transaction Tokens solve the inside of the house. An API gateway receives an external access token, swaps it at a Transaction Token Service for a short-lived
txntoken+jwt, and every internal workload in the call chain gets the same signed transaction ID and context. The Txn-Token never leaves the trust domain.So what does the API gateway actually have to work with when it calls the TTS?
OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation
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Making the act Claim Mean the Same Thing in Every Token
Alice tells an AI travel agent to book a trip. The agent gets a token from her enterprise IdP, trades it at the travel provider's AS for an access token, and calls a booking tool. The booking tool gets a Transaction Token and calls an internal inventory service.
By the time the inventory service sees a request, three different issuers have touched the token. Each one had to decide whether to say "Alice, via the agent, via the booking tool," and how.
AOB