Meeting · IETF 127
OAuth WG at IETF 127
San Francisco, US · November 14 to 20, 2026
23 drafts on the agenda, 23 reviewed here. Reviewed drafts have a short summary and a link to the full review. The rest show the draft's own abstract. Official agenda, revision 04 →
Agenda as of November 16, 2026. It can change before the meeting.
Wednesday (120 min) 8 slots
Chairs Intro
OAuth 2.1
The OAuth 2.1 Authorization Framework
OAuth 2.0 is spread across too many documents. To build it correctly today you need RFC 6749, RFC 6750, PKCE, Native Apps, Browser-Based Apps, and the Security BCP.
OAuth 2.1 folds all of that into one Standards Track document and drops the parts the Security BCP found to be insecure. It is a consolidation. It is not a new protocol.
CIMD
draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document -03
OAuth Client ID Metadata Document (CIMD)
An OAuth client needs a
client_idand registered metadata at every authorization server it talks to. A client that talks to servers it has no relationship with can't register manually.Dynamic Client Registration lets the client register itself, but each server then has registration data to manage and clean up.
Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant
draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant -06
Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant (ID-JAG)
Two apps both use the same IdP for SSO. One wants to call the other's API on behalf of the user. Today that takes an interactive OAuth flow between the two apps, and the IdP never sees it.
This draft lets the IdP broker that access. The client trades its ID Token for a short-lived grant, the ID-JAG, and redeems it at the other app's authorization server. No redirect and no consent screen. The draft calls the pattern Cross-App Access (XAA).
Delegate SD-JWT
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Delegate SD-JWT, Holder-Signed Delegation Chains
A Holder of an SD-JWT (RFC 9901) can present it to a Verifier and prove possession of a key. The Holder can't hand that credential to someone else to present on its behalf.
A Verifier can forward an SD-JWT it received. Section 1 names what is missing: the forwarder can't prove it was the recipient of the original presentation, and it can't trim the transaction data.
Deferred Token Response
draft-ietf-oauth-deferred-token-response -01
"Deferred Token Response: authorization_pending for Every Grant"
Every OAuth grant today assumes the authorization server can decide on the spot. The client makes a token request, and it gets back a token or an error.
That breaks down when the decision isn't the AS's to make right now. A fraud analyst needs to look at a wire transfer. A human has to review a passport scan. An identity governance workflow needs sign-off from a manager and a resource owner. An agent asks for a scope beyond what its principal pre-approved.
KYAPay Token
draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token -04
Bot management systems block AI agents because they can't tell them apart from scrapers and credential-stuffing bots. Skyfire's answer is a signed token from a third-party issuer that has done KYC on the human. The token is meant to be "a strong signal of human presence behind agentic requests." Bot managers, fraud systems, CIAM systems, and the target service all read the same token on the way in.
The payment half lets the agent pay the merchant in the same request. It carries a Visa Intelligent Commerce or Mastercard Agent Pay credential, or a USDC payment.
Agentic Authorization OAuth 2.1 Extension
draft-rosenberg-oauth-aauth -02
AAuth Agentic Authorization OAuth 2.1 Extension Summary
An agent doesn't know in advance which APIs it will call. The usual answer is a broadly scoped token, and agents make mistakes with broadly scoped tokens.
The draft's answer is to start the agent with almost nothing and ask the user at the moment of each risky operation. The question the user sees is written by the resource server, not the agent: "ReserveBot wants to book a table for two at Joe's Italian on Friday at 9pm."
Thursday - Joint OAuth/WIMSE (120 min) 10 slots
Chair Intro
Identity Chaining
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Identity Chaining Is in the RFC Editor Queue
A client in one trust domain needs to call an API in another. Each domain has its own authorization server. The second domain needs to know which user the request is for and what was authorized.
This draft names a pattern for that. The client does a Token Exchange at its own authorization server to get a JWT authorization grant. It then presents that grant to the other domain's authorization server using RFC 7523. No user interaction happens in the second domain.
OAuth–WIMSE–SPIFFE Boundaries
The Future of Client ID
AuthZen
SPIFFE OAuth Client Authentication
draft-ietf-oauth-spiffe-client-auth -03
OAuth SPIFFE Client Authentication
A workload running under SPIFFE already has an attested credential, its SVID. To call an OAuth token endpoint today it still needs a second credential, a client secret or a
private_key_jwtkey, provisioned out of band.This draft lets the workload use the SVID itself as its OAuth client credential. It covers all three SVID formats: JWT-SVID, X509-SVID, and WIT-SVID.
Cross-Domain Transaction Tokens
draft-fletcher-oauth-txn-token-chaining-profile -01
Taking a Transaction Token Across the Trust Boundary
Transaction Tokens carry the authorization context of a request through a company's internal call chain. They are deliberately scoped to one trust domain. The Txn-Token spec says a Txn-Token MUST NOT be accepted outside the trust domain named in its
aud.So what happens when a workload deep in that call chain needs to call a partner API?
Transaction Tokens for Agents + Txn Tokens BCP
draft-araut-oauth-transaction-tokens-for-agents -03
Transaction Tokens for Agents Adds an Agent Chain Claim to Txn-Tokens
Transaction Tokens carry user identity and transaction context through an internal call chain. They say nothing about whether an AI agent was involved.
That's the gap this draft targets. A database three hops deep can't tell a direct human API call from a request that passed through two autonomous agents. Audit logs record the operation but not the agent path that caused it.
draft-araut-oauth-transactiontokens-bcp -00
Transaction Tokens BCP Has Real Deployment Lessons and Several Conflicts With the Base Spec
Transaction Tokens define a token format and a request to the Transaction Token Service (TTS). They don't say how to roll that out across hundreds of services.
This draft tries to fill that gap. Section 1.2 says the guidance is "derived from production deployments of Txn-Token systems." It covers token size, lifetime, propagation libraries, validation rollout, telemetry, and async workloads.
Transactional Access Tokens
draft-tulshi-oauth-transactional-access-tokens -00
Transactional Access Tokens Bring Txn-Token Context to the Front Door
Transaction Tokens solve the inside of the house. An API gateway receives an external access token, swaps it at a Transaction Token Service for a short-lived
txntoken+jwt, and every internal workload in the call chain gets the same signed transaction ID and context. The Txn-Token never leaves the trust domain.So what does the API gateway actually have to work with when it calls the TTS?
OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation
draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile -01
Making the act Claim Mean the Same Thing in Every Token
Alice tells an AI travel agent to book a trip. The agent gets a token from her enterprise IdP, trades it at the travel provider's AS for an access token, and calls a booking tool. The booking tool gets a Transaction Token and calls an internal inventory service.
By the time the inventory service sees a request, three different issuers have touched the token. Each one had to decide whether to say "Alice, via the agent, via the booking tool," and how.
Friday (120 min) 10 slots
Chairs Intro
OAuth Transaction Authorization Challenge
draft-rosomakho-oauth-txn-challenge -01
An access token says the caller is allowed to talk to an API. It doesn't say a human approved this particular $5,000 payment.
That gap gets wider with agents. An agent framework might show the user a confirmation prompt, but the resource server never sees it and gets nothing it can validate. And sometimes the person who needs to approve isn't the user at all. It's the owner of the resource, or a manager, or an admin.
Client Instance Identifiers
draft-mcguinness-oauth-client-instance-id -01
Client Instance Identification for Attestation-Based Client Authentication
One
client_id, many instances. An app on every managed laptop, a container per replica, an agent runtime per host. ABCA gives each instance its own key and a short-lived attestation for that key. That's enough to know "this is a legitimate instance holding this key right now."It's not enough to know "this is the same instance as before." ABCA Section 10.6 requires a fresh attestation for every new key, and the attestation only carries the key. After a rotation, a continuing installation looks exactly like a brand new one. If the AS suspended an instance, it can't tell whether the thing knocking with a new key is that instance or a different one. Audit history tied to the old key stops.
Client Attester Endorsement
draft-mcguinness-oauth-client-attesters -01
Client Attester Endorsement, the Missing Link Between ABCA and CIMD
ABCA lets a Client Attester vouch for a Client Instance and the key it holds. Before the AS relies on that, it needs to know two things: is this attester trustworthy, and is this attester allowed to speak for this client?
ABCA punts on both. Section 10.8 says trust establishment and key resolution are out of scope, then lists a few options. One of them is "kid combined with Client Metadata," pointing at the client's own
jwks_uri.OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Parameter for Requiring DPoP
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OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Parameter for Requiring DPoP
A client can tell from AS metadata that an authorization server supports DPoP. It cannot tell that the AS requires it.
Today the client finds out by failing. It sends a token request without a DPoP proof, gets an error, and guesses that DPoP was the reason. RFC 9449 defines no specific error for a missing proof, so the guess is unreliable.
OAuth 2.0 Audience-Bound Token Exchange
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Letting the Audience Decide Who Can Exchange Its Tokens
A resource server receives an access token audienced to itself. It needs to call a downstream API. That token is no good downstream, so the resource server uses Token Exchange to swap it for one with the right audience.
The question this draft asks is narrow: how does the authorization server decide that the client asking for the exchange is allowed to?
OAuth 2.0 Authority Metadata
draft-zehavi-oauth-authority-metadata -00
It's a metadata extension. It adds one
authority_metadatamember to both Protected Resource Metadata and AS Metadata. It defines no new endpoints, grants, parameters, or error codes. That fits the charter.Normative dependencies are light: RFC 6749, 8414, 8707, 9396 and 9728. It also points to the OpenID Foundation AuthZEN token issuance and token exchange profiles as the expected consumers. Resource metadata gets resolved and passed to a policy decision point.
OAuth 2.0 Bounded Work Authorization
draft-liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work -00
Bounded Work Authorization, a Requirements Document for the Mission and Schemas Drafts
OAuth can revoke a token. It has no shared way to say "the task the user approved is over."
An agent doing one job collects many tokens through code exchange, refresh, and token exchange. Nothing ties them to the one approval. Section 1.1 says an operation can be denied when the agent's identity and token are both valid, because the work has ended.
Agent Authorization use cases and gap analysis
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Agent Authorization Use Cases and Gap Analysis
This is not a protocol document. It proposes no new mechanism and has no IANA actions. It is a survey: 11 agent use cases in three categories, each with a requirements list and a gap analysis against OAuth 2.0 and its extensions, offered as a foundation for future OAuth WG work.
The genuinely novel contribution — and the thing worth engaging with — is a conceptual split the draft introduces in §2 and then uses as the spine of the whole document:
The Intent Token - A Credential for Delegated User Intent
draft-chen-oauth-agent-intent-token -00
A user tells an agent "plan my business trip to Singapore." The agent decides which scopes that requires. Nobody checks its work.
The draft calls this the semantic gap. The user approved a goal, and the client translated it into permissions. A buggy or malicious client can ask for more than the goal needs, and the user can't tell.